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An Olympic-sized puzzle 
When Rio won the bid to host the Olympic Games of 2016, it was supposed to 
be a moment that resonated throughout the world. It would signify the arrival 
of both the city and Brazil into the first world, a regeneration of the infamous 
favelas, the riddance of gangs and violence, a brand new infrastructure for 
sport and transportation, and all of this would be shared on the world stage. 
Sadly, none of this was to happen (Boykoff and Mascarenhas 2016, 6). 
The International Olympic Committee took several months to finally 
characterise the Rio Games: “the most perfect imperfect Games”, according to 
an IOC spokesman late 2016 (Reis, Rodrigues de Sousa-Mast and Gurgel 2014, 
447). It makes you wonder what it actually means. Were the Games truly 
imperfect, or more or less close to perfection? A sport event of such magnitude 
involves massive investments in infrastructure and once the event has ended, 
stakeholders might not always consider these structures to be an asset (Feblowitz 
2012, 12). But how were the Rio Games different from the events hosted by 
London or Beijing? What caused Rio’s Olympic legacy to be so looked down 
upon? Local taxpayers understandably demand that the high costs related to any 
economic or environmental developments will eventually improve their living 
conditions. So it is possible to find out what it is that has the potential to make or 
break the outcomes of an Olympic Games? 
 
In an attempt to answer our exploratory research question, “Why are certain 
Olympic legacies more successful and enduring than others?” we will be digging 
into the theoretical work of the economist Daron Acemoğlu and political 
scientist James A. Robinson and hold it up against the legacies of the Beijing 
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2008, London 2012, and Rio 2016 Olympic Games in an effort to show that the 
inclusive and extractive characteristics belonging to each country’s Organising 
Committee for the Olympic Games (BOCOG, LOCOG and ROCOG) clearly 
had an effect on the legacy outcomes (Acemoğlu and Robinson 2013, 70-73). 
Specifically, we will show that the type of stakeholder matters when it comes to 
leveraging power and salience, to what extent these stakeholders are included in 
the decision-making process, and in which ways incentives can tip the scales of 
balance in the case of a world-class event (Theodoraki 2007, 78). 
We shall be directing our focus solely on the Summer Olympics. Whilst 
the Winter Olympics do share certain elements with their warmer counterparts, 
the number of sports disciplines and participating athletes is significantly 
smaller. The Summer edition of the Games also enjoys greater popularity 
amongst the public, evidenced by the degree of media coverage, television 
ratings and live attendance numbers (Agha, Fairley and Gibson 2012, 126). The 
particular selection of the three aforementioned Olympiads is based on the 
changes made to the IOC bidding and legacy guidelines after the financially 
devastating Athens 2004 Games, which had a detrimental and long lasting effect 
on the national economy. Also, all three Olympic Games took place after the 
IOC chose to amend its Charter to include a stronger emphasis on a more 
sustainable legacy.  
A brief outline of the design and methodology of our case study: First we 
decide upon a definition of legacy that takes into account the three pillars (a 
focus on social-, environmental- and economic factors) set out by the IOC 
Charter for a sustainable legacy. This then sets the boundaries in between which 
an analysis of the Olympic legacy outcomes will take place. Next, our focus 
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shifts to the ways in which each OCOG operationalised its mission with a 
particular emphasis on stakeholder inclusion, leverage and incentives. 
Consequently, in testing the theory presented by Acemoğlu and Robinson we 
determine the extent to which each organisation fits the inclusive or extractive 
mould, leaving us to establish any compelling causal relationships that could 
explain the differences between Olympic Games regarding their legacies (de 
Vaus 2001, 3). 
 
Why Acemoğlu and Robinson? 
Before we set out to examine the past three Olympiads, let us take a closer look 
at the theoretical framework that will guide us through our analysis.  
Several months ahead of the 2012 London Olympic Games, this well-
known duo published a book titled Why Nations Fail, in which they argue that 
the only determinant of a nation’s prosperity lies in its institutions. Not 
geography or culture, or even education. The two authors do not reject the 
premise that location or cultural factors might matter in the understanding of 
these differences, but they do insist that when everything else is equal, 
incentives can inspire and motivate people towards innovation, leading to 
further education and investments, which in turn have the potential to 
positively influence a country’s wealth. Not all but some institutions actually 
offer the possibilities and the platform for these incentives (Acemoğlu and 
Robinson 2013, 75). 
Roughly speaking, the central thesis of Acemoğlu and Robinson’s Why 
Nations Fail is that at a national level, political and economic institutions need 
to be inclusive to promote any kind of sustained economic growth (Acemoğlu 
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and Robinson 2013, 73-91. The immediate questions though are: what makes 
these inclusive institutions preferable over their extractive brothers and sisters, 
and is this theory also applicable to Organising Committees for the Olympic 
Games? 
In starting off, the differences that exist between these institutions ought 
to be determined in an effort to understand why inclusiveness is preferential 
over the extractive form of an institution, and in what way they are required if 
one wishes to grow the economy. These differences may include the political 
system and technological advancements, but more importantly the incentive 
structures that motivate actors to contribute within an institution. First, within 
an inclusive political system, the governing executives will consider 
everyone’s input valuable, whilst politically extractive institutions are likely to 
undermine the contributions of the many and exclude all that do belong to a 
very narrow group of elites. An extractive organisation could be described as 
an organisation that disproportionately favours one stakeholder group, most 
typically senior management and shareholders, at the expense of the 
others.  For example, they may be criticised as a company for overly focusing 
on short-term shareholder value at the expense of other stakeholders 
(Acemoğlu and Robinson 2013, 72-76; 304-310). 
Another discrepancy between both types of political institutions touches 
upon the issue of incentives. In the case of an extractive institution which 
strongly favours the elite over the masses, any construction that promotes 
incentives will be targeted at serving this group alone. Within an extractive 
institution, the ruling elite is terrified of handing out incentives to the public, as 
they fear the threat of creative destruction that might arise when incentives that 
	 5 
do convince the masses to contribute could potentially lead to changes or 
developments in processes and methods, putting their power and the status quo 
at risk (Acemoğlu and Robinson 2013, 75-81). 
Inclusive institutions, on the other hand, are just that. In this case, any 
incentive structure that exists is set up in such a way that everyone that 
operates within the institution, regardless of status, has a fair chance of earning 
whatever benefits are connected to it. Within these institutions, oftentimes 
these incentives are there to promote innovation and the development of new 
technologies, or just to incentivise people to participate in the political system. 
An inclusive organisation tends to find a healthy balance between internal 
stakeholders (especially management and employees) and has an inclusive 
economic model, whereby benefit is shared more equally amongst employees, 
management, shareholders, customers, and the community (Acemoğlu and 
Robinson 2013, 79-82).  The cultures of inclusive institutions tend to be far 
more merit-based and co-creative, with contributing individuals welcome to 
participate and share in the organisation’s innovation agenda. These 
organisations are usually more flexible and dynamic and better able to deploy 
resources where they count the most, as well as to more easily make 
adjustments as conditions change. 
The possibility of achieving economic growth through a form of 
technological advancements is often also viewed differently by inclusive and 
extractive organisations. Whilst extractive institutions recognise that it is 
possible, they find it unsustainable. Due to a lack of incentives, very little 
development or change will take place, and the fear of creative destruction 
remains a frightening issue for the elite. Inclusive institutions actually see the 
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benefits of this creative destruction (Acemoğlu and Robinson 2013, 76-83). 
They consider these innovations as welcome improvements to society, and 
with proper incentives, it has the potential to allow for sustained economic 
growth and political stability over a much longer period of time. We should, 
however, emphasise that the political and economic systems are to a great 
degree co-dependent. Within a society, political institutions have the power to 
determine the characteristics of economic institutions, and they often follow 
each other. 
In their book, Acemoğlu and Robinson apply their theory mainly on 
political institutions that operate at the national level. We, on the other hand, 
began to wonder about the role that this theory could play in describing an 
organisation that is strongly tied to the politics and government of a nation due 
to its significant stakeholder leverage: the Organising Committee for an 
Olympic Games. Like nations, such an organisation has political and economic 
axes that must be optimized to ensure effectiveness and success.  The volume 
of academic literature has, however, been limited on the topic of balancing the 
needs of multiple stakeholders who are involved in the Organising Committee 
with the goal of ensuring positive legacy outcomes and long-term 
sustainability. We therefore state the claim that the theory’s applicability goes 
beyond that of national political institutions described by Acemoğlu and 
Robinson, and intend to show that Organising Committees of Olympic Games 
not only operate as political institutions at the highest level of government, but 
especially how the theory has definite merit when applied to the organising 
juggernauts of the Olympic Games in particular. 
 
	 7 
Power politics and lots of stakeholders 
Olympic Games organising committees can often be found at the centre of the 
events’ governance structure. In an effort to shed some light on the importance 
of the political axes and diverse stakeholders within such an organisation, we 
will take a closer look at the general structure and its functions, which parties are 
included and what these various stakeholder relationships entail (Parent 2015, 
55). 
Fire and foremost, the organisation behind the Olympic Games can be 
considered a sport organisation that often has thousands of employees working 
to set up and host one of the largest sporting events in the world (Slack and 
Parent 2006, 53). However, operating on a massive budget, these organisations 
can also be seen as a business. Then again, when viewed from a legacy 
standpoint, they might even qualify as a cause. Seeing just how socially 
responsible an Olympic Games can be, they could even be used as an instrument 
to promote environmental sustainability (Vancouver 2010) or youth participation 
in sports and cultural activities (London 2012). Moreover, seeing as an 
organising committee is typically put together by a number of partners (e.g. 
government entities, the IOC and other stakeholders) with the goal of 
constructing the event, it also qualifies as a network administration organisation 
(Parent 2015, 56). The partners in these networks often occupy a seat on the 
Board of Directors and aim to not only reach their individual objectives but also 
to complete the network goals of successfully organising the event and creating 
effective legacies. Next, NAOs also fall within the category of strategic 
alliances due to the exchange of knowledge that takes place between partners. 
Another label the organisation can carry is that of a political entity. It is 
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composed of representatives from its closest partners and a variety of 
backgrounds and each and every department within the organisation will have to 
engage with any number of stakeholders to obtain necessary resources. Finally, 
these OCOGs are also outsourcing organisations (Parent 2015, 57). They tend to 
have a limited timeframe and funds to complete their goal, and also have to deal 
with issues from human resource management and legacy to media and sport. 
 
Following the above, it should now be clear that organising committees are 
required to be both flexible in nature and wide in operational scope. They are 
often at the front and centre of most stakeholder networks and are burdened with 
the responsibility of finding out ways to not just deal with each of them, but also 
to successfully undertake its own responsibilities in organising the event (Parent 
and Deephouse 2007, 13). The literature roughly distinguishes between primary 
and secondary stakeholders, where the former is critical for the organisation’s 
operations and the latter is much more dispensable. A number of major 
stakeholders are known to possess an exceptionally high degree of leverage (or 
salience) within these networks, and these are often with whom the organising 
committee work closest. The first of these primary stakeholders is usually the 
government at national, regional and local levels (Mitchell, Angle and Wood 
1997, 871). They typically provide financial support, agree to certain guarantees 
related to the event, and if required will second their own workforce to assist the 
organising committee. Government stakeholders also control the immigration 
and security aspects of international events. In turn, local government is in 
charge of municipal services that need taking care of (e.g. traffic and law 
enforcement). 
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Secondly, we are not to overlook the community. Whether it be 
residents, schools, small business enterprises, or any other kind of local 
organisation; together they comprise not just the public who finances the 
Games through taxation, but they also come out to participate in the event by 
either purchasing tickets or otherwise spending on the event. 
Thirdly there are the sport organisations and federations that exist from 
local to international elite level (Leopkey and Parent 2009, 193). These sport 
organisations are in charge of sanctioning any official event and the 
administration of competition rules and formal regulations. They also provide 
licensed officials and umpires who are tasked to make sure that the event is 
correctly run. 
Next we have the media and sponsors in all its shapes and sizes. Media 
adds to the resources of the organising committee through its procurement of 
broadcasting rights and the coverage and visibility it provides of the event itself 
and its affiliated sponsors and contractual partners. In exchange, sponsors also 
contribute financially or through otherwise-determined resources.  
Finally, the organising committee may request the support of a number of 
organisations depending on a particular situation.  Examples include the UN, 
human rights or environmental advocacy groups, minority representatives, or 
any other specific consultants (Parent and Deephouse 2007, 14-15). 
 
When organising the Olympic Games, OCOGs arrange themselves into a 
number of departments by key functional areas that need to be dealt with 
(Provan and Kenis 2007, 240). Most Olympic Games are known to have 
upwards of 50 of these areas. Unsurprisingly, organising committees are often 
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unable to cover all of them, requiring it to outsource a section of work to capable 
stakeholders. Maintaining and building trusted relationships with these 
stakeholders is therefore of great importance in assuring the successful 
completion of the tasks.  
More often than not, a Board of Directors that is composed of 
representatives from key stakeholders and interest groups leads the organising 
committee. It is the only part of the organisational body that will have been 
present from the very beginning, and it is also this Board that determines the 
‘spirit’ or motto of the event, the initial direction that the Olympics is going to 
take, and where any financial and managerial issues are decided upon. The 
Board of Directors is also the level at which any political matters or conflicts of 
interest between the committee and stakeholders are discussed and resolved. 
(e.g. politically motivated redevelopment of favelas in Rio de Janeiro prior to 
2016).  
 
Design and methodology 
Once every 48 months the sporting world and all its media frenzy gather 
together in one country, one city, for the Olympic Games. Over time, the event 
has become a catalyst for all kinds of development, as countries compete against 
each other on the international stage (Essex and Chalkley 1998, 190). In many 
cities, the legacies of the Olympics have left them with enormous tourist 
attractions or much needed upgrades to public infrastructure, while others saw 
the hosting of the Games as a defining moment in their path towards a brighter 
future. Why, though, are certain Olympic legacies more successful and enduring 
than others? Is there any causality to be found that could assist us in 
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understanding key success-factors for future Olympic events? We refer back to 
Acemoğlu and Robinson’s theory and strongly believe that for a large part, these 
differences stem from the inclusive and extractive institutional characteristics of 
each Organising Committee for the Olympic Games.  
This paper adopts a case-study approach, and it will analyse the legacy 
outcomes and institutional differences of the Beijing 2008, London 2012 and 
Rio de Janeiro 2016 Olympic Games. Such an approach is especially useful 
when we ask questions about events that we simply cannot control and also 
when we choose to test existing theories, as we will be doing with the theory 
presented by Acemoğlu and Robinson. If at all possible, any causal relationships 
that may be found could shed light on the differences in legacy outcomes 
between the three events (de Vaus 2001, 3; Lijphart 1971, 686) 
Moreover, our choice for such a specific sampling of three cases is not 
because of any statistical value (which would require a greater number of cases), 
but primarily due to the potential theoretical implications that will hopefully 
allow us to compare institutional differences and their effects on Olympic 
legacies (Hautbois, Parent and Séguin 2012, 265-267). We will focus on an 
analysis of the stakeholders that are included in the organising and decision-
making process, their unique interests and leveraging power, and to what extent 
incentives had a role to play in their motivations. All three events share a 
common run-up time (the timeframe for preparing and delivering the event is the 
same in all three cases) and a common goal (to host a successful Olympic 
Games) (Theodoraki 2001, 114). 
For the events involved, data was collected from archival material and 
the author’s personal experiences when working for and alongside the 
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organising committees for the duration of the three Olympic events (Scheu and 
Preuss 2017, 15-24). The material is mostly derived from government websites, 
the IOC database, government issued post-event debriefing reports and 
newspaper articles about or referring to the events. For each Olympic Games, 
the collected data gave us insight into the structure of the OCOG and the variety 
of legacy outcomes. It also allowed us to identify the different (key) 
stakeholders that were involved in the event and consequently provided us with 
the opportunity to estimate each stakeholder’s impact on the event’s legacy. In 
turn, the author’s experiences were used to confirm or shed light on abstractions 
or issues that required clarification in the archival material.  
 
Defining Legacy 
Throughout the past few decades, the Olympic Games have grown into events of 
such unfathomable magnitude that it would be a grave mistake to overlook the 
element of legacy (Gratton and Preuss 2008, 1931). The IOC has even placed a 
strong emphasis on the concept throughout its own Charter and bidding 
guidelines. Candidates who are therefore interested in hosting the Games are 
required to take legacy into account. However, what does legacy actually entail? 
The literature provides a variety of event legacies, but not a single all 
encompassing definition (Preuss 2015, 655). Then again, despite recognition of 
the need for a multidimensional approach to legacy, in practice most of the focus 
has been on physical infrastructure or the economic dimension. Sadly, this 
definition is woefully incomplete as it fails to include any of the intangible 
legacies that we have come to know, such as public welfare and national pride. 
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The definition of legacy proposed by Jean-Loup Chappelet, however, is both 
comprehensive in scope and also similar to the one used by the IOC in their 
post-event debrief reports from 2009 onwards (Chappelet 2012, 82). It 
differentiates between sport legacy, economic legacy, environmental legacy, 
urban legacy, and social legacy, and it covers both the tangible and intangible 
structural changes that take place according to Holger Preuss: “Legacy is any 
action in a given area and time driven from structural changes initiated by 
staging of the Olympic Games” (2007). According to this second definition, 
structural changes are fundamental for legacy because they last longer than the 
Olympic Games, offering permanent and on-going opportunities for action 
(Leopkey and Parent 2012, 939). They are the result of a shift or change in the 
basic ways that a social or economic system operates (e.g. community or 
society). Therefore, when put together, we have a single definition that not only 
differentiates from the primary impact of the Olympic Games (e.g. economic 
impact or worldwide media interest), but also delineates the tangible and 
intangible legacy outcomes through six different categories and is compatible 
with the triple bottom line approach (social, environmental and economic 
pillars) to a sustainable legacy that the IOC has included in its Olympic Charter 
(O’Brien and Chalip 2008, 42). 
 
Beijing 2008 Analysis 
When we ask people on the streets of Beijing what they believe to be the most 
enduring legacy of the 2008 Games, many will likely answer that it was the 
return of China’s grand status in the world and a reinvigoration of its people’s 
national pride and self-esteem (Zhou, Ap and Bauer 2012, 188). The Chinese 
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carry with them a proud history that stretches back over 5000 years. Their 
traditions and culture are deeply cherished and respected. However, for over a 
century, China had to suffer through the domination of both the West and later 
its neighbour Japan. The Games of Beijing 2008 were more than just a sports 
event. To many Chinese, it symbolised the official announcement of China’s 
return to the international arena as a beckoning superpower (Luo and Huang 
2013, 444). China’s leaders saw the Olympics as a springboard towards 
modernisation and as an opportunity to reach out to the West. Beyond that, the 
Games were most certainly also a diplomatic exercise in public relations on a 
scale never before seen (Gong 2012, 204). 
The significance of the Beijing Games can simply not be underestimated. 
The event received support from the people, the party and the government, and 
no stone was left untouched during the preparations and planning of the 
spectacle (Preuss and Alfs 2011, 61). Moreover, financial guarantees were 
secured from both the central government as well as the capital municipality and 
over a million of Beijing’s residents have shown interest in volunteering during 
the event. Put together, it adds up to a legacy of mass cohesion cooperation 
amongst the population (Liu, Broom and Wilson 2014, 494). 
The Games are known to touch upon nearly every section of society. 
Right after winning its bid in 2001, the capital started on a massive construction 
and investment programme. Over USD 40 billion was spent on the entire Games 
(Li, Blake and Thomas 2013, 239). This included modernisation of the city’s 
airport and infrastructure, over 30 competition venues and the difficult fight 
against air and water pollution. Next, in a mass effort to upgrade and expand its 
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outdated public transportation network, Beijing invested an addition USD 11 
billion to prepare the city for the coming decades.  
The Beijing Olympics were also the very first “Green Games” that 
emphasised environmental sustainability and the use of high-tech innovations in 
pursuit of cleaner and more efficient logistical processes and venue operations 
(Zhang and Zhao 2009, 251). Part of the legacy of the Games was also to instil a 
greater awareness of the environment among the local population. Gradually, 
more people started to understand the impact that these matters have on the 
quality of life (Chen et al. 2013, 439). BOCOG, working closely with Beijing’s 
local authorities, managed to incorporate a host of environmentally friendly 
elements into the construction of the venues. A fifth of all power consumed 
came from renewable sources and new energy standards have been introduced 
for building constructions in the years since the Games (Dong and Mangan 
2008, 2030).   
When it comes to education, the Games were successful in bringing the 
values of the Olympic movement and sports to over 420 million children across 
half a million Chinese schools. On top of this, BOCOG and the Chinese 
Education Ministry partnered over 500 Chinese schools with schools abroad to 
conduct cultural exchanges. Since the Games took place, the Chinese 
government has remained committed to the education and promotion of a 
healthy lifestyle and sports participation (Chen and Tian 2015, 270). 
 
Beijing’s focus on placing sports and the athletes at the very centre of the event 
had a tremendously positive effect on the Games. Also, the relationship between 
BOCOG and its stakeholders and delivery partners was greatly strengthened 
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after the many rounds of road-test before the Games actually commenced. The 
incredible open posture of BOCOG most definitely contributed to their very 
rapid and steep learning curve. The Chinese were more than happy to be 
educated in this regard, and thanks to the IOC’s expertise and guidance along the 
way, Beijing is already underway at hosting the 2022 Winter Olympics (Heere 
and Xing 2012, 177; Parent, Schafer and Rouillard 2011, 98). 
 
The biggest challenges that BOCOG had to face were, however, on the part of 
its diverse stakeholders (Mitchell, Angle and Wood 1997, 876). Whereas issues 
regarding integration remain a difficult challenge when it comes to the 
organisation of the Olympic Games (mostly due to the dazzling complexity and 
the sheer scale), BOCOG did not worry about the risk of departments and 
stakeholders getting stuck in individual ‘silos’ and becoming non-collaborative. 
The organising committee aimed to control and coordinate the Games through a 
top-down approach, maintaining as much oversight as possible over 
management and execution of the direction of the event (Cha 2008, 115). 
The primary stakeholders consisted of multiple levels of government, 
including leaders from the municipality authorities and the central government 
and ministries, and the IOC. Further partnerships were maintained with 
international and local business enterprises and sponsors, media outlets, 
international sports federations and the local community. Following the theory 
described by Acemoğlu and Robinson, the Beijing organising committee 
showed some characteristics of an extractive institution. It allowed government 
parties and major sponsors to occupy significant positions of power and it 
treated smaller stakeholders as little more than consultants in the process of 
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stakeholder governance (Zhang and Zhao 2009, 246). BOCOG also went out of 
its way to hire its own staff and internalise many of the operations within the 
organisational body. The work that needed to be done in preparation of the 
Games required capable and qualified personnel. From finance and transport to 
marketing and tourism, the committee ended up consisting of over 40 
departments with a staff total of over 5000. Later, BOCOG also hired specialists 
from all around the world, totalling up to 10,000 (Parent, MacDonald and Goulet 
2014, 212). Summed up, over the course of the preparation phase of the Games 
many outside (foreign) stakeholders were brought into the BOCOG-fold and 
became part of the organising committee (Zhou, Ap and Bauer 2012, 189). 
Even though the organisation did show characteristics that were of 
politically extractive nature, it eventually gathered and solidified enough 
expertise to make the Games a success. Surprisingly, though, whilst the 
organising committee’s overall direction of management was indeed tightly 
controlled by the highest levels of government through their strong stakeholder 
salience, BOCOG remained exceptionally receptive to outside talent, foreign 
knowledge and expertise, new advanced technologies, and even allowed for (a 
limited extent of) creativity and input in its operations (Heere and Xing 2012, 
165). Sound ideas and suggestions regarding operations were communicated up 
the bureaucratic chain of command, and more often than not approved. 
Moreover, BOCOG’s workforce was already incentivised and fired up by the 
strong desire and willingness to contribute and partake in organising a 
spectacular global event that would put China on the world map and leave a long 
lasting legacy, and it required little additional incentive to convince them to 
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perform at their utmost best and deliver an event of a magnitude never seen 
before (Dong and Mangan 2008, 2033). 
The existence of these contradictory elements in discussing an 
extractive institution could be due to the fact that China had never before 
hosted an Olympic Games, and, determined to get it right on its first attempt, 
was willing to open herself up to the world in search of necessary know-how 
and guidance (Acemoğlu and Robinson 2013, 422-426). Or, as Acemoğlu and 
Robinson also discuss in their book Why Nations Fail, it could be an early sign 
of the Chinese ruling elite testing the waters of inclusive political institutions 
by experimenting on a single event. The academic duo has not made it a secret 
that they strongly believes that China’s political institutions in their current 
form will become the limiting factor in any further development of the nation’s 
society and economy (Acemoğlu and Robinson 2013, 427). This, however, is a 
discussion better left for a future paper. 
 
London 2012 Analysis 
The slickness of the London 2012 Olympic Games was hard to pinpoint. It 
seemed like every aspect of the event just fit perfectly together. In reality, the 
London organising committee LOCOG had carefully formulated, coordinated 
and executed a strategy that not only engaged the public in activities and events, 
but also inspired them to share their enthusiasm (Girginov and Hills 2009, 168). 
London 2012 emphasised sport and culture, but it did not fail to draw in 
stakeholders and volunteers. The strategy adopted by LOCOG resulted in 
excitement all across the board, enlisting athletes and artists to go out and spread 
their message (Girginov and Hills 2008, 2091-2116; Thornley 2012, 206). 
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London’s mottos were ‘Everyone’s Games’ and ‘Inspire a Generation’, and they 
both were true. Besides the obvious goal of hosting an excellent Games for 
athletes and attendees, London set its sights on using the Olympics to create a 
legacy that would catalyse the development of the city and the country. LOCOG 
set its sights on the following: transforming the community, creating social 
change, pushing for sustainable development, and a strong push to inspire 
youngsters through the benefits of culture, education, art and sport (Gold and 
Gold 2013, 3533). 
One of the aims of the London 2012 Games was to also deliver legacies 
that were related to education and culture. Through the special Cultural 
Olympiad, many children and young adults were inspired to participate in 
cultural activities (Pappalepore and Duignan 2016, 351). The London Games 
Makers, more commonly known as the massive volunteer workforce, were so 
pleased with their experience that over 80% indicated that they would be willing 
to take up a similar position again in the future (Pappas 2014, 12). 
After spending nearly GBP 13 billion on organising the Olympic Games, the 
government has estimated that the positive impact on the economy lies 
somewhere in between GBP 28 and 41. According to them, the Games not only 
helped lower the unemployment rate, but also created significant revenue 
streams throughout manufacturing and construction sectors. Roughly 97% of the 
London 2012’s GBP 8 billion worth of contracts was won by UK businesses. 
Furthermore, tourism revenue during the Games already reached GBP 700 
million and is expected to remain high (Smith 2009, 116). 
The Games most certainly had a catalysing effect on the development of 
the East End. Post-Olympics, the Olympic Park was renamed Queen Elizabeth 
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Olympic Park and it saw the construction of many lasting benefits, including 
roads and means of transport (Brown, Smith and Assaker 2016, 168). The 
expansion of the local economy through shops and stores, has been accompanied 
by the construction of new bridges and transport lines. The number of 
employment opportunities has continued to grow in the Olympic Park area and 
due to the newfound and increased attention for the region it will continue to 
promote investment and larger numbers of visitors. The Olympic Village has 
been re-branded as the East Village, and will contain close to 3,000 new homes 
for over 6,000 residents (Prayag et al. 2013, 639). 
Overall sustainability had always been a big priority for LOCOG. Since 
taking home the bid in 2005, London has continued to push for the inclusion of 
these principles throughout all its plans (Kenyon and Bodet 2018, 240). Mass 
scale projects were initiated to clean up soil and many of London’s waterways, 
and we saw a growing practice of waste recycling. Organisers set up a decade-
long ecological blueprint for the city, and planted over 200,000 plants and a 
thousand trees throughout the Olympic Park (Davis and Thornley 2010, 95). 
 
LOCOG’s aim was never just about organising and hosting an outstanding 
edition of the Games. The committee’s ambition reached far beyond that. They 
sat down with stakeholders, partners and others external groups to eventually 
come up with a legacy that would piggyback on the Games, and allow the event 
itself to be instrumental in delivering a number of public benefits (Séguin, 
Parent and O’Reilly 2010, 215). From the regeneration and development of 
London’s easternmost boroughs to the realisation of programmes that are aimed 
at promoting sport amongst young children… None of this would have been 
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possible without the tireless and inclusive efforts from all stakeholders who were 
willing to participate in achieving these outcomes (Davies and Mackenzie 2014, 
782). From day one, LOCOG set out to build strong and lasting relationships 
with special interest groups at national, municipal and community levels, and it 
sat down with environmental specialists, educators, sports federations, and many 
others to make sure it was on the right track with its strategies and event 
planning, making clear that it very much welcomed input from these invaluable 
partners (Mitchell, Angle and Wood 1997, 881). The willingness to contribute 
could be found in both the spirit of the Olympic Games, as well as the incentives 
that come with partaking in the run up and the legacy of the event (Grabher and 
Thiel 2015, 333). From construction companies that were proud to be selected 
for their quality of work and the contracts that came along, to diverse interest 
groups who just wanted to have their voices heard and witness some form of 
positive development in a community, city or country they care deeply about. It 
was precisely this open attitude that fostered such good-will towards the 
Olympics throughout the country. Communities felt they were part of the 
Olympic movement and a sense of pride swept through the nation (Girginov 
2011, 13). 
What we tend to forget is the contextual situation in which London’s organisers 
had to operate. Not only were they faced with a severe economic recession, they 
also had to deal with serious threats to the security of the event. LOCOG, 
however, proved that when the governance model adopted by the organising 
committee is well-structured and inclusive, no challenge is too big (Coakley and 
Souza 2013, 580-582). By shifting its focus on building and maintaining close 
relationships with its stakeholders and partners, LOCOG learned that it quickly 
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became more flexible, allowing it to respond to rapid and sudden changes in its 
environment. Through close to ten years of cooperation with its partners and 
clear definitions of the roles and tasks of its stakeholders, London’s organising 
committee turned itself into a first-class host that was more than equipped to 
deliver (Davies and Mackenzie 2014, 783). 
 
Rio 2016 Analysis 
In 2009, Rio won its bid to host the Summer 2016 Olympics, marking a historic 
moment for the Olympics, and for South America. This was the first time a 
South American country had ever hosted the Summer Olympic Games. The 
reaction from the Rio Olympic Organising Committee and from the residents in 
Rio was initially positive (Osorio and Versiani 2014, 256). Residents of Rio 
took to the beaches, dancing and celebrating the bid win. The Brazilian Olympic 
officials were convinced that both the resources and facilities which the Games 
would require could not possibly become an issue, and they went on to draw up 
a grandiose plan that placed the emphasis on an environmentally sustainable 
legacy (Maiello and Pasquinelli 2015, 120). Included among the goals were 
initiatives for environmental awareness, renewable energy use and management, 
improving air quality, soil protection, utilising sustainable designs and 
construction techniques, promoting reforestation, and improving solid waste 
management. 
The Olympics were expected to provide a great number of legacy 
benefits to Rio. One being the chance to clean the waterways, bays, and 
beachfront water in and around the city. The population in Rio has grown so fast 
that sanitation and other infrastructure has not been able to keep up. As a result, 
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approximately half of the city’s waste, from its nine million residents, flows into 
rivers and eventually to Guanabara Bay (Lindau et al. 2016, 198). 
Also part of the greater legacy of the Rio Olympic Games was a 
programme known as Transforma. It was set up by ROCOG to support children 
in connecting with the world of sports by focussing their attention towards the 
inspirational athletic performances taking place in their own country (Rocha and 
Fink 2017, 21). After the programme’s launch in early 2013, over 7 million 
children from all around Brazil were introduced to it. Furthermore, Rio was 
supposed to leave a social and economic legacy that would include programmes 
that would lower the unemployment rate by educating young adults on 
technological and other professional skills that they could use after the Games 
took place. Civic campaigns were supposed to remain active even after the main 
Olympic event was completed and the country’s record-breaking tourism figures 
of 2016 were predicted to last for years to come in light of a successful Games 
and the opportunity of showing off Rio in all its glory to the outside world 
(Schausteck de Almeida, Marchi Júnior and Pike 2014, 278). 
 
As the 2016 Summer Olympics approached, these legacy plans began to falter. 
Thousands showed their displeasure with the Olympics by protesting just days 
before the Games were to start. By then, Brazil’s economy was drowning in a 
recession and it saw its GDP slipping away at a rate of 5 percent annually for 
two straight years (Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013, 144). The country’s 
unemployment rate had exceeded 11 percent. Inflation had just reached double 
digits. The main cause of this was Rio’s dependence on oil. The government 
owned and operated the oil company, Petrobras, announced in the years leading 
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up to the Olympic bid that it had discovered a substantial oil field off the 
Brazilian coastline (Lindau et al. 2016, 200). As a result, Rio expected healthy 
revenue streams coming in through the royalties connected with Petrobras. With 
the excitement from winning the Olympic bid, the state took on heavy financial 
commitments that were connected with the upcoming Games. The promised 
increase in revenues, however, did not materialise as expected (Boykoff and 
Mascarenhas 2016, 8). Oil revenues stalled, leaving Rio with a mounting debt 
and facing a financial crisis. Public employees had already gone weeks and 
months without pay, basic public services had been neglected, and the city was 
close to defaulting on its debt (Osorio and Versiani 2014, 256). 
 
In addition to economic challenges facing Rio 2016, political forces also stymied 
the build-up to the Games. Brazil, once known for its leap towards inclusive 
institutions starting from the 1970s, now faces a level of corruption at all levels 
of politics that risks spinning out of control. This vicious cycle of political and 
economic extractive institutions that sees a small elitist group determine a 
country’s development has begun to unravel (Schausteck de Almeida, Marchi 
Júnior and Pike 2014, 276-277). The profits that could be made on the oil craze 
and many of the lavish Olympic construction projects were just too hard to pass 
for many politicians and construction executives. Some reports indicated that 
nearly USD 2 billion dollars were lost due to corruption that involved members 
of the federal government, local and state officials, as well as nearly 200 
members of the Brazilian senate and congress. Corruption conditions even led to 
the impeachment of the president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, and the removal of 
a handful of cabinet ministers (Reis, Rodrigues de Sousa-Mast and Gurgel 2014, 
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447). Even Brazil’s very own IOC representative was removed from office after 
corruption charges were brought up in the wake of the Olympics. 
Understandably, the breakdown of services, revelations of vast corruption, 
extensive layoffs and failure to pay workers, growing violence, and the waste of 
Olympics spending provoked widespread and militant political protest (Rocha 
and Fink 2017, 24). 
 
Amid all this social, economic, and political turmoil, the Rio Organizing 
Committee for the Olympic Games (ROCOG) was scrambling to prepare the 
city for the event. Regardless of its primary stakeholders being government and 
corporate entities, the economic downturn and political unrest directly impacted 
ROCOG’s ability to deliver the event (Rocha and Fink 2017, 24). It was long 
unclear if the public transportation network would be functional or if many of 
the competition and related venues would be ready. In July 2016, the Rio city 
government allocated an extra USD 46 million to help with last-minute 
preparations, and following a declaration of a state of calamity by the state 
governor, an additional USD 900 million in emergency aid was agreed upon by 
the federal government to assist in the much needed infrastructure and security 
(Maiello and Pasquinelli 2015, 119). Many sports venues failed or simply didn’t 
even have test events. Power supply to all venues was in question. Construction 
was rushed and, in many places, shoddy. As athletes arrived at their village days 
before the competition began, they found lodging with dysfunctional plumbing 
and electricity. Some teams were forced to relocate temporarily. Not to mention 
the virulent outbreak of the mosquito-borne Zika and the safety concerns that 
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cast a dark shadow over the Games (Schausteck de Almeida, Marchi Júnior and 
Pike 2014, 276). 
 
ROCOG’s primary and most salient stakeholders and financiers were 
government and corporate entities. Many had positions on ROCOG’s Board of 
Directors, and had been in charge of the organisation’s strategy and direction 
from the very beginning. What became clear over the course of the run-up to the 
Games, however, was that Rio 2016 was not going to follow in the footsteps of 
Beijing or London when it came to an approach that was meant to include all of 
society, but instead the primary objective was to put up a spectacle aimed at the 
outside world that showed the beauty and level of development that Brazil and 
Rio have reached (Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013, 141). 
Any incentives of participating in the hosting of the event were generally 
aimed at a small circle of elites and mostly came in the shape of (illicit) financial 
profit or personal prestige. These stakeholders chose to neglect and put aside the 
pressing issues that still exist within their country and that have become so 
deeply entrenched due to extractive political and economic institutions and 
behaviour. Society’s poorest (e.g. families living in the favelas) were completely 
excluded from calculations related to the Olympic event, and were often 
uprooted without any compensation for the sake of a Games and its legacy that 
they would never be a part of (Schausteck de Almeida, Marchi Júnior and Pike 
2014, 280). Even if the possibility existed to allow ROCOG to isolate the 
organisation from any elitist government or corporate stakeholders; considering 
just how deeply extractive in nature the political and economic institutions in 
Brazil are, it would have been very unlikely for ROCOG to have successfully 
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pulled off a better edition of the Games than what we have now experienced. 
Especially when taking into account the overwhelming political, economic and 
societal difficulties that it had to face (Andranovich, Burbank and Heying 2001, 
122).  
 
Beijing 2008 Assessment 
In the case of Beijing’s organising committee for the Olympic Games, we have 
discussed a number of legacy outcomes that have not only made it through the 
event, but already managed to last for a decade. All this despite the 
organisation being strictly governed from the top down by stakeholders and 
members of the Board of Directors who often belong to the highest and most 
influential government entities. They were in charge of managing and 
determining the strategy and approach to the Games, and had a final say in the 
extent to which BOCOG opened up to other stakeholders and partners. Many 
tasks that are usually outsourced were brought in-house, with exception to 
construction work, event delivery and security. Although some of the 
organising committee’s operations fit the mould of an extractive institution, 
especially considering how strictly controlled it was, it does not abide by all the 
characteristics as determined by Acemoğlu and Robinson. The organisation 
was intent on hosting an edition of the Games that succeeded at all levels, and 
included the entire population. Financial profit was never a priority and instead 
the actual goal was to present the world with a never before-seen spectacle that 
announced China’s re-emergence in the global arena, all whilst simultaneously 
reaching out to the world in a welcoming gesture of engagement. The Games 
were also meant to fill the Chinese population with a renewed sense of pride 
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and unity. In an effort to succeed, BOCOG did not shy away from accepting 
any guidance and support it was offered. In one way, the organising committee 
resembles the current Chinese political climate. Both the Board of Directors 
and the Communist Party leaders believe they know best how to navigate the 
challenges of further development, and refuse to hand over the reigns. 
So is it possible to draw up any causal relationships between Beijing’s 
positive legacy outcomes and the institutional makeup of its OCOG? We 
believe that the case of Beijing is an exception to the inclusive and extractive 
institutional theory. Despite the organisation showing signs of an extractive 
institution through a very narrow governing elite, its openness to work 
alongside stakeholders and the willingness to include new technologies 
throughout the run-up to the Games might have affected the outcomes in a 
positive way. 
 
London 2012 Assessment 
In the case of London 2012, we see an organising committee that was insistent 
on including as many stakeholders as possible from the onset of the bidding 
process. Acknowledging the fact that its primary stakeholders remained 
government entities, they did not single-handedly determine the course of the 
Olympic event. The Board of Directors was made up of representatives from a 
myriad of stakeholders, partners and specialists, and together they decided on a 
path towards the 2012 Olympics that allowed for continuous input and 
flexibility. As to the theory, this governance structure suits the makeup of an 
inclusive institution, as it not only provided incentives for all participants to 
step up and contribute, but also presented the institution with opportunities to 
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evolve and become more efficient over time thanks to either new technologies 
or ideas. The London Games not only costs far less than Beijing and Rio, it still 
managed to inspire and aspire a nation and the world through a well 
coordinated and thought out strategy that would only have been possible if 
LOCOG was open to the opinions of its stakeholders. By paying attention and 
listening to representatives, partners and other interested parties, LOCOG 
distilled a message that not only resonated with the people in the short-term, 
but also left a lasting mark on the country that as its legacy outcomes continue 
to thrive. 
 The London 2012 Games and its legacies have been widely embraced 
by the people due to the overall value it has brought to not just the capital but 
the entire country. Through the analysis of post-event surveys and reports, we 
have determined that a causal relationship exists between the positive legacy 
outcomes and the organising committee’s institutional makeup. LOCOG is a 
prime example in which the inclusion and interaction with stakeholders who 
represent a great number of interest groups leads to legacy outcomes that are 
not only carried by the support of the greater population, but when 
communicated well, can inspire for generations. 
 
Rio 2016 Assessment 
Finally, the 2016 Olympic Games. The author recalls how he happened to be in 
Rio on the day the city won its bid in 2009, and the shock he felt when he 
returned there in the run-up to the event in early 2016. The job at hand for an  
organising committee of an Olympic Games is enormous. In the political 
climate of Brazil and Rio, however, it became seemingly impossible. Every 
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OCOG is highly dependent on the support of the host-country’s government. 
Yet, in Brazil’s case, political institutions at all levels were so deeply 
entrenched in their extractive makeup that there was no way for ROCOG to 
isolate itself. ROCOG’s Board of Directors and its primary stakeholders 
consisted of the government and corporate elite, and they immediately took 
hold of the organisation. The political and economic issues also transcended 
into society. A significant part of the population has become sceptical about 
institutions and organisations that are government affiliated. Employees of 
ROCOG were unable get paid due to a lack of funds, and stakeholder 
incentives were either unavailable or being abused. 
 Sadly, Rio’s legacy outcomes amounted to very little. Apart from a very 
costly public transportation network, there is barely anything left of the event. 
ROCOG just managed to scrape by through the actual event itself, and many 
construction projects are still to this day left unfinished. The venues that did 
reach completion are now unattended due to a shortage of maintenance funds, 
and many of the education and youth programmes have grinded to a halt. In the 
case of the Rio Games, in a country that is currently at the mercy of extractive 
political institutions and one that faces economic turmoil and a recession, 
ROCOG became an instrument of profit and prestige for the elite. Therefore, 
the causal relationship that we derive from this is that in a politically extractive 
organisation, legacy outcomes will be disappointing or non-existent. 
 
We have now completed our analysis of the legacies, institutional makeup and 
stakeholder relationships of the three Olympic Games, and drawn two causal 
relationships. In conclusion, we would like state that we believe that the 
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success of an Olympic Games ultimately depends on how well the organising 
committee is able to cooperate with an often complicated network of 
stakeholders. Such a relationship should preferably not only exist through 
formal contracts, but ideally it is embedded within the hearts and minds of both 
parties. Stakeholders often possess a great amount of experience and it would 
be wise to continue researching better ways of integrating them into the 
planning processes of organising committees. Finally, to make Olympic 
legacies truly sustainable, organisers must dare to think much bigger and 
further ahead in time (e.g. decades instead of years), and legacies should be 
integrated into the preparations and initial plans from the earliest stages of the 
bidding process. 
 
Conclusion and reflection 
Throughout this paper we attempted to answer the question, “Why are certain 
Olympic legacies more successful and enduring than others?” We believed that 
Acemoğlu and Robinson’s theory of inclusive and extractive institutions would 
also apply in the case of these organising committees. OCOGs are inherently 
political through their close ties with private and especially government partners, 
and they show striking similarities to the institutions described by the authors in 
their book Why Nations Fail. Our case study approach allowed us to analyse and 
filter the legacy outcomes of all three Olympic events using a predetermined 
definition of legacy, after which we took a closer look at the organising 
committees and their institutional makeup. We focussed specifically on the 
stakeholder relationships and the incentives that may or may not exist depending 
on the Committee being inclusive or extractive in nature. 
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 From our case study, we believe to have derived clear relationships in 
two of the three cases. Namely, London and Rio de Janeiro. The former showed 
clear signs of having opted for a governance structure that was, as Acemoğlu 
and Robinson would describe, inclusive in nature. There was plenty of incentive 
for all partner and stakeholders to participate and contribute to the success of the 
Games. London managed to not only keep costs low but deliver an event that 
brought along a legacy that is not only welcomed by the public but will endure 
for years to come. 
Rio on the other hand seemed cursed from the beginning. Brazil’s current 
political and economic institutions are in turmoil and deeply extractive in nature. 
Corruption and disincentives led to little or no interest for participation from the 
masses. The elite members of the Board of Directions abused the organisation 
and its mission by usurping the necessary finances, effectively bleeding ROCOG 
dry, and certainly did not care for the legacy outcomes which the event had 
promised to deliver. 
In conclusion, we would like to note that the lessons learned from each 
Olympic Games are not at all entirely valid for future hosts. Even though the 
IOC has managed to create a knowledge transfer service for potential hosts, we 
have come to see that the relationship between the Organising Committee and its 
stakeholders is yet to be perfect. Through further research and studies, a case 
like Rio’s 2016 Games can potentially be avoided, saving both the IOC and the 
host country a good amount of resources and worry. 
  
	 33 
References 
 
- Acemoğlu, D. and J.A. Robinson. 2013. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of 
Power, Prosperity and Poverty. London: Profile Books. 
- Andranovich, G.D., M.J. Burbank and C.H. Heying. 2001. ‘Olympic cities: 
lessons learned from mega-event politics’. Journal of Urban Affairs, 23(2): 113-
131.  
- Agha, N., S. Fairley and H. Gibson. 2012. ‘Considering legacy as a multi-
dimensional construct: The legacy of the Olympic Games’. Sport Management 
Review, 15: 125-139. 
- Boykoff, J. and G. Mascarenhas. 2016. ‘The Olympics, Sustainability, and 
Greenwashing: The Rio 2016 Summer Games’. Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 
27(2): 1-11. 
- Brown, G., A. Smith and G. Assaker. 2016. ‘Revisiting the host city: An 
empirical examination of sport involvement, place attachment, event satisfaction 
and spectator intentions at the London Olympics’. Tourism Management, 55: 
160-172. 
- Cha, V.D. 2008. ‘Beijing’s Olympic-Sized Catch-22’. The Washington 
Quarterly, 31(3): 105-123. 
- Chappelet, J.-L. 2012. ‘Mega sporting event legacies: a multifaceted concept’. 
Papeles de Europa, 25: 76-86. 
- Chen, F. and L. Tian. 2015. ‘Comparative study on residents' perceptions of 
follow-up impacts of the 2008 Olympics’. Tourism Management, 51: 263-281. 
- Chen, Y., G.Z. Jin, N. Kumar and G. Shi. 2013. ‘The promise of Beijing: 
Evaluating the impact of the 2008 Olympic Games on air quality’. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 66: 424-443. 
- Coakley, J. and D.L. Souza. 2013. ‘Sport mega-events: Can legacies and 
development be equitable and sustainable?’ Motriz, 19(3): 580-589. 
- Davies, A. and I. Mackenzie. 2014. ‘Project complexity and systems integration: 
Constructing the London 2012 Olympics and Paralympics Games’. International 
Journal of Project Management, 32: 773-790. 
- Davis, J. and A. Thornley. 2010. ‘Urban regeneration for the London 2012 
Olympics: Issues of land acquistition and legacy’. City, Culture and Society, 1: 
89-98. 
- Dong J. and J.A. Mangan. 2008. ‘Beijing Olympics Legacies: Certain Intentions 
and Certain and Uncertain Outcomes’. The International Journal of the History 
of Sport, 25(14): 2019-2040. 
- Essex, S. and B. Chalkley. 1998. ‘Olympic Games: catalyst of urban change’. 
Leisure Studies, 17 (3): 187-206. 
- Feblowitz, M. 2012. ‘The Legacy Games: Social and Economic Impacts for 
Summer Olympics Host Cities’. Social Impact Research Experience SIRE, 14: 
1-22. 
	 34 
- Girginov, V. and L. Hills. 2008. ‘A Sustainable Sports Legacy: Creating a Link 
between the London Olympics and Sports Participation’. The International 
Journal of the History of Sport, 25(14): 2091-2116. 
- Girginov, V. and L. Hills. 2009. ‘The political process of constructing a 
sustainable London Olympics sports development legacy’. International Journal 
of Sport Policy, 1(2): 161-181. 
- Girginov, V. 2011. ‘Governance of London 2012 Olympic Games legacy’. 
International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 47: 1-16. 
- Gold, J.R. and M.M. Gold. 2013. ‘Bring It under the Legacy Umbrella: Olympic 
Host Cities and the Changing Fortunes of the Sustainability Agenda’. 
Sustainability, 5: 3526-3542. 
- Gong, J. 2012. ‘Re-Imaging an Ancient, Emergent Superpower: 2008 Beijing 
Olympic Games, Public Memory, and National Identity’. Communication and 
Critical/Cultural Studies, 9(2): 191-214. 
- Grabher, G. and J. Thiel. 2015. ‘Projects, people, professions - Trajectories of 
learning through a mega-event (the London 2012 case)’. Geoforum, 65: 328-
337. 
- Gratton, C. and H. Preuss. 2008. ‘Maximizing Olympic Impacts by Building Up 
Legacies’. The International Journal of the History of Sport, 25(14): 1922-1938. 
- Hautbois, C., M.M. Parent and B. Séguin. 2012. ‘How to win a bid for major 
sporting events? A stakeholder analysis of the 2018 Olympic Winter Games 
French bid’. Sport Management Review, 15: 263-275. 
- Heere, B. and X. Xing. 2012. ‘BOCOG's road to success: predictors of 
commitment to organisational success among Beijing Olympic employees’. 
European Sport Management Quarterly, 12: 161-181. 
- Kenyon, J.A. and G. Bodet. 2018. ‘Exploring the domestic relationship between 
mega-events and destination image: The image impact of hosting the 2012 
Olympic Games for the city of London’. Sport Management Review, 21: 232-
249. 
- Leopkey, B. and M.M. Parent. 2009. ‘Risk management issues in large-scale 
sporting events: A stakeholder perspective’. European Sport Management 
Quarterly, 9: 187-208. 
- Leopkey, B. and M.M. Parent. 2012. ‘Olympic Games Legacy: From General 
Benefits to Sustainable Long-Term Legacy’. The International Journal of the 
History of Sport, 29(6): 924-943. 
- Li, S., A. Blake and R. Thomas. 2013. ‘Modelling the economic impact of sports 
events: The case of the Beijing Olympics’. Economic Modelling, 30: 235-244. 
- Lijphart. Arend. 1971. ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method’. The 
American Political Science Review, 68(3): 682-693. 
- Lindau, L.A., G. Petzhold, V. Bergamaschi Tavares and D. Facchini. 2016. 
‘Mega events and the transformation of Rio de Janeiro into a mass-transit city’. 
Research in Transportation Economics, 59: 196-203. 
	 35 
- Liu, D., D. Broom and R. Wilson. 2014. ‘Legacy of the Beijing Olympic 
Games: a non-host city perspective’. European Sport Management Quarterly, 
14(5): 485-502. 
- Luo, S. and F. Huang. 2013. ‘China's Olympic Dream and the Legacies of the 
Beijing Olympics’. The International Journal of the History of Sport, 30(4): 
443-452. 
- Maiello, A. and C. Pasquinelli. 2015. ‘Destruction or construction? A (counter) 
branding analysis of sport mega-events in Rio de Janeiro’. Cities, 48: 116-124. 
- Mitchell, R.K., B.R. Agle and D.J. Wood. 1997. ‘Toward a theory of 
stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what 
really counts’. Academy of Management Review, 22: 853-886. 
- O’Brien, D. and L. Chalip. 2008. ‘Sport events and strategic leveraging: Pushing 
towards the triple bottom line’, in A. Woodside and D. Martin (eds.), Advancing 
tourism management. Cambridge, MA: CABI Publishing. 
- Osorio, M. and M.H. Versiani. 2014. ‘Rio de Janeiro and the 2016 Olympics: a 
lasting legacy?’ International Journal of Urban Sustainable Development, 6(2): 
254-258. 
- Pappalepore, I. and M.B. Duignan. 2016. ‘The London 2012 cultural 
programme: A consideration of Olympic impacts and legacies for small creative 
organisations in east London’. Tourism Management, 54: 344-355. 
- Pappas, N. 2014. ‘Hosting mega events: Londoners' support of the 2012 
Olympics’. Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Management, 21: 10-17. 
- Parent, M.M. 2015. ‘The Organizing Committee's Perspective’. In M.M. Parent 
and J.-L. Chappelet (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Sports Event 
Management (43‐64). London: Routledge. 
- Parent, M.M. and D.L. Deephouse. 2007. ‘A case study of stakeholder 
identification and prioritization by managers’. Journal of Business Ethics, 75: 1-
23. 
- Parent, M.M., J.P. Schafer and C. Rouillard. 2011. ‘Event rights holders versus 
host nations: Who is accountable, for what, and to whom, for an Olympic 
Games?’, in H. Gammelsaeter and G. Bielons (eds.), 19th European Association 
for Sport Management Conference. Madrid, Spain: GB Creation and Advice 
Consulting. 
- Parent, M.M., D. MacDonald and G. Goulet. 2014. ‘The theory and practice of 
knowledge management and transfer: The case of the Olympic Games’. Sport 
Management Review, 17: 205-218. 
- Prayag, G., S. Hosany, R. Nunkoo and T. Alders. 2013. ‘London residents’ 
support for the 2012 Olympic Games - The mediating effect of overall attitude’. 
Tourism Management, 36: 629-640. 
- Preuss, H. 2007. ‘The Conceptualisation and Measurement of Mega Sport Event 
Legacies’. Journal of Sport & Tourism, 12(3-4): 207-228. 
- Preuss, H. 2015. ‘A framework for identifying the legacies of a mega sport 
event’. Leisure Studies, 34(6): 643-664. 
	 36 
- Preuss, H. and C. Alfs. 2011. ‘Signaling through the 2008 Beijing Olympics - 
Using Mega Sport Events to Change the Perception and Image of the Host’. 
European Sport Management Quarterly, 11(1): 55-71. 
- Provan, K.G. and P. Kenis. 2007. ‘Modes of network governance: Structure, 
management, and effectiveness’. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, 18: 229-252. 
- Reis, A.C., F. Rodrigues de Sousa-Mast and L.A. Gurgel. 2014. ‘Rio 2016 and 
the sport participation legacies’. Leisure Studies, 33(5): 437-453. 
- Rocha, C.M. and J.S. Fink. 2017. ‘Attitudes towards attending the 2016 
Olympic Games and visiting Brazil after the games’. Tourism Management 
Perspectives, 22: 17-26. 
- Sánchez, F. and A.-M. Broudehoux. 2013. ‘Mega-events and urban regeneration 
in Rio de Janeiro: planning in a state of emergency’. International Journal of 
Urban Sustainable Development, 5(2): 132-153. 
- Schausteck de Almeida, B., W. Marchi Júnior and E. Pike. 2014. ‘The 2016 
Olympic and Paralympic Games and Brazil’s soft power’. Contemporary Social 
Science, 9(2): 271-283. 
- Scheu, A. and H. Preuss. 2017. ‘The Legacy of the Olympic Games from 1896-
2016: A Systematic Review of Academic Publications’. Mainzer Papers on 
Sport Economics and Management: 1-115. 
- Séguin, B., M.M. Parent and N. O’Reilly. 2010. ‘Corporate support: A corporate 
social responsibility alternative to traditional event sponsorship’. International 
Journal of Sport Management and Marketing, 7: 202-222. 
- Slack, T. and M.M. Parent. 2006. Understanding sport organisations: The 
application of organisation theory. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. 
- Smith, A. 2009. ‘Theorising the relationship between major sport events and 
social sustainability’. Journal of Sport and Tourism, 14: 109-120. 
- Theodoraki, E. 2001. ‘A conceptual framework for the study of structural 
configurations of organising committees for the Olympic Games (OCOGs)’. 
European Journal For Sport Management, 8: 106-124. 
- Theodoraki, E. 2007. Olympic event organization. London: Butterworth-
Heinemann. 
- Thornley, A. 2012. ‘The 2012 London Olympics. What legacy?’ Journal of 
Policy Research in Tourism, Leisure and Events, 4(2): 206-210. 
- de Vaus, David. A. 2001. Research Design in Social Research. London: Sage 
Publications. 
- Zhang, L. and S.X. Zhao. 2009. ‘City branding and the Olympic effect: A case 
study of Beijing’. Cities, 26: 245-254. 
- Zhou, J.Y., J. Ap and T. Bauer. 2012. ‘Government motivations for hosting the 
Beijing 2008 Olympic Games’. Journal of Tourism and Cultural Change, 10(2): 
185-201. 
 
